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Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture†
By Simon Board and Marek Pycia*
A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a 
sequence of prices over time. Each period the buyer can also exer-
cise an outside option, abandoning their search or moving on to 
another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the 
seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly 
price, contravening the Coase conjecture. We then embed the single-
seller model into a search framework and show the result provides a 
foundation for the usual “no haggling” assumption. (JEL C78, D42, 
D43, L12, L13)
The Coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory, inform-
ing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of com-
mitment. The idea is that, for any given price, high value buyers are more likely 
to purchase than low value buyers, leading to negative selection in the demand 
pool. Accordingly, the seller cuts its price over time, causing high value buyers to 
delay their purchases. The seller’s inability to commit thus leads its later selves to 
exert a negative externality on its former selves, reducing its overall profit (Gul, 
Sonnenschein, and Wilson 1986). This idea of negative selection is robust: versions 
of it hold when costs are nonlinear (Kahn 1986), when goods depreciate over time 
(Bond and Samuelson 1984), when there is entry of new buyers (Sobel 1991) and 
when the buyers face future competition (Fuchs and Skrzypacz 2010).
In this article, we show that the Coase conjecture fails in a natural environment 
where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise. We consider a 
seller who faces a buyer (or a continuum of buyers) with unknown value for the 
good and unknown outside option. Each period, the seller chooses price  p t ; the 
buyer then chooses to buy, wait, or exercise his option and terminate the game. 
The outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product. For 
example, when waiting for the price of the iPhone to fall, a customer could instead 
buy a comparable phone from a competitor. Similarly, when bargaining over the 
price of a car, a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer. The 
outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation 
has terminated. For example, after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar, a tourist could 
start seeing local attractions.
* Board: UCLA, 8283 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095 (e-mail: sboard@econ.ucla.edu); Pycia: UCLA, 
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In Section I, we take the outside option as exogenous and show that there is unique 
equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price equal to the monopoly price 
against its demand. Intuitively, if the buyer expects the price to stay high, then those 
with low values exercise their outside option and exit the market. As a result, there 
is no negative selection in the demand pool and no price cut is forthcoming.
To understand why the monopoly pricing equilibrium is unique, suppose prices 
do fall over time, and let  u _ be the lowest net value of types who delay. In the con-
tinuation game, the seller will never lower its price below  u _, since this would leave 
rents on the table. Type  u _ will thus receive zero utility and should take his outside 
option in period t = 1, contradicting the assumption that he delays. The overall idea 
is that the outside option results in low value types exiting and positive selection in 
the demand pool. This is very natural: when shopping in a bazaar, a high price quote 
from a seller is more likely to lead a low value buyer to move on to the next stall 
rather than wait for a price reduction.
High-priced equilibria have been produced in other durable goods models. 
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) show that if the buyer expects an out-of-equilibrium 
price cut to be followed by Coasian pricing, then one can sustain prices that are arbi-
trarily high. Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1987) suppose the seller has the option 
to consume the good and show that if the buyer expects the seller to consume early, 
he is less willing to delay purchasing, causing the seller to become more pessimistic 
over time and justifying the belief that the seller consumes early. In both of these 
cases there are multiple equilibria, including those with Coasian dynamics; in our 
paper, the monopoly equilibrium is unique.
Analogs to the unraveling logic in our article have been seen before. In Diamond 
(1971), N firms choose prices {  p 1 , … ,  p N }, and buyers pay a positive cost to search 
one more firm; in equilibrium, all firms choose the monopoly price. Both papers fea-
ture a holdup problem—a buyer must be rewarded some utility for paying a search 
cost (or forgoing an outside option) but the seller has the incentive to extract the 
utility after the buyer has made his decision. Hence, the buyer with the lowest utility 
regrets searching (or forgoing the outside option), leading this behavior to unravel 
from the bottom. However, the models have different implications, since Diamond’s 
buyers are held up when they leave a seller, whereas our buyers are held up when 
they stay. If a firm could make multiple price offers, Diamond’s sellers would thus 
suffer from the Coase problem whereas our seller charges the monopoly price. 
Similar logic is at work in Perry (1986), in which two parties bargain via alternat-
ing offers under two-sided uncertainty. He proves that if there is a known fixed cost 
of making an offer and no discounting, then the game terminates in a single round. 
However, this result breaks down when discounting is introduced (Cramton 1991) 
or when offer costs are private information (Rubinstein 1985; Bikhchandani 1992), 
with buyers signaling their types by waiting. In comparison, our article considers 
a Coasian framework, discounting payoffs and allowing both the buyer’s valuation 
and outside option to be private information.1
1 There are also other related papers. In Compte and Jehiel (2002), two parties bargain via alternating offers, 
where one is tempted to mimic a commitment type but is restrained by the outside option of the opponent. Deb 
(2010) shows that there is a constant price equilibrium in a Coasian model when buyers’ values are stochastic, 
where the constant renewal of high types prevents the seller from walking down the demand curve.
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We end Section I by analyzing the robustness of our monopoly pricing result. 
In Section IA we show that the result continues to hold even if taking the outside 
option is reversible. For example, when bargaining at a bazaar, a buyer may return 
to negotiate after some time has passed. In Section IB we then examine the form 
of the equilibrium if some types have no outside options and show that the optimal 
first-period price converges to the monopoly price as the number of such zero-option 
types shrinks.
In Section II, we endogenize the outside option by considering a model of sequen-
tial search. Each period, a buyer chooses whether to stay with the current seller or 
move on to an alternative seller where he receives a new value draw; the chosen 
seller then quotes a sequence of prices over time. In this case, the value from future 
search opportunities constitutes a buyer’s outside option and allows us to apply our 
monopoly pricing result. In equilibrium, a seller faces buyers who arrive over time, 
receive one offer, buy if their value is sufficiently high, and otherwise move on.
Our model thus shows that even if the Coase conjecture applies to a single seller, 
it may fail when there are competing sellers who generate an outside option for 
a buyer. This result complements Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) and Gul (1987) 
who consider direct competition between price-setting sellers. These models have 
multiple equilibria ranging from traditional Bertrand pricing to monopolistic pric-
ing that is sustained through Bertrand punishments. In contrast, our model has a 
unique equilibrium and does not rely on non-Markovian punishments that might be 
hard to coordinate. Our monopoly pricing result significantly simplifies the analysis: 
once we have proved that sellers choose constant prices, the equilibrium is similar 
to Wolinsky (1986) or Anderson and Renault (1999), albeit with proportional dis-
counting. One can thus view our results as providing a foundation for Wolinsky’s 
assumption that sellers do not haggle.
I. The Failure of the Coase Conjecture
We start by looking at how the presence of the buyer’s outside option changes 
equilibrium play in an otherwise standard Coase conjecture setting. A monopoly 
seller tries to sell a durable good to a single buyer in periods t ∈ {1, 2, … }. The 
seller’s cost of producing the good is c = 0 and is commonly known. The buyer 
privately knows his value for the good v ∈ V ⊂ [0,   _ v ] and the value of his outside 
option w ∈ W ⊂ [  w _,   _ w ], where  w _ > 0 and  _ v ,   _ w are finite. The values (v, w) are 
drawn from a distribution with support contained in V × W ; the distribution is com-
monly known.2
The timing is as follows: at the start of any period t, the seller chooses price 
p t ≥ 0. The buyer then chooses whether to buy the good, exercise his outside option, 
or wait. All actions are publicly observable, and we allow for mixed strategies. The 
game continues only if the buyer chooses to wait. Waiting is costly as the buyer and 
seller discount their utility with a common discount factor δ ∈  ( 0, 1 ) . If the buyer 
buys the good in period t, he obtains utility  δ t ( v −  p t ) , and the seller obtains profit 
2 The distribution over (v, w) is not restricted and may have gaps and atoms; the assumption of bounded support 
is made to ensure a monopoly price exists. We do require that outside options are bounded below; in Section IB we 
show that our results are robust to including a small number of zero-option types.
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δ t p t . If the buyer exercises the outside option in period t, he obtains utility  δ t w, and 
the seller obtains profit 0. If the buyer waits forever, both the seller and buyer obtain 
0. A public history of the game—or, for short, history—is any finite sequence of the 
seller’s and buyer’s consecutive actions, starting with the first price decision of the 
seller.3
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a history-contingent sequence of the 
seller’s offers  p t , the buyer’s acceptance and exercise decisions, and of updated 
beliefs about the buyer’s values  ( v, w ) such that: actions are optimal given beliefs; 
beliefs are derived from actions from Bayes’ rule whenever possible, including off 
the equilibrium path; and the seller’s actions, even zero-probability actions, do not 
change its belief about the buyer’s type. An equilibrium is essentially unique if all 
equilibria lead to the same payoffs. Notably, essential uniqueness does not pin down 
prices off the equilibrium path.
Define u := v − w as the net value of the buyer. Let F(u) be the probability the 
buyer’s net value is strictly below u (which coincides with the cdf when there is no 
atom) and assume the monopoly price  p  m ∈ argmax p ( 1 − F ( p ) ) is unique.4 The 
buyer and seller follow monopoly strategies if in every period
 (i) The seller charges  p m ;
 (ii) The buyer buys the good if u ≥ p and otherwise exercises his outside option.
We first show that in any PBE, prices cannot fall below the lowest net value  u _ at any 
history. If this did happen then the seller would give type  u _ rents in some periods. 
When rents are maximal the buyer purchases immediately in any PBE; raising the 
price a little would not induce any delay, because of discounting, and is therefore a 
profitable deviation.
LEMMA 1: In any PBE, if the seller believes that the buyer’s net value is above  u _ at 
some history, then it charges prices above  u _ at that history.
PROOF:
Fix a PBE. Let  u _( h ) be the minimum of the support of the seller’s belief about 
the net values of the buyer at history h, and let  p _( h ) be the minimum of the sup-
port of prices the seller charges at h. We wish to show that  p _( h ) >  u _( h ) for all 
histories h. By way of contradiction, assume that  p _( h ) <  u _( h ) for some histories 
h, and let Δ = su p h  ( u _( h ) −  p _( h ) ) > 0 be the least upper bound on undiscounted 
rents the lowest net-value buyer types can receive. Since prices are nonnegative, 
Δ is finite; for any ϵ ∈  ( 0,  1 − δ _2  ) , we can then pick a history  h t at time t at which 
 u _( h t ) −  p _( h t ) >  ( 1 − ϵ ) Δ.
3 We assume that the buyer does not exercise his outside option in period 0, before entering the game. This could 
be because the buyer does not know his value before visiting the seller, as in the search model in Section II.
4 The proof of Proposition 1 shows that there is no delay no matter what  p 1 is charged so, if there are multiple 
optimal prices, the seller can pick any one and will thus obtain the same revenue in all PBEs.
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We claim that at history  h t the seller puts probability 1 on the buyer immedi-
ately buying at any price p ≤  p _( h t ) + ϵ Δ. At time t, each type prefers to buy now 
rather than take the outside option because he gets positive rents from buying, 
u − p ≥  u _( h t ) −  p _( h t ) − ϵ Δ > 0. It follows that v − p > w >  δ s−t w, so each 
type prefers to buy at t rather that exit in period s > t. Finally, we wish to show that 
each type prefers to buy at t rather than buy in a future period. To see this, suppose 
some positive measure set of types did decide to wait and purchase at time s > t, 
where  h s is the resulting continuation of history  h t . By Bayes’ rule  u _( h s ) ≥  u _( h t ), so 
the definitions of p and of  h t imply that
  u _( h s ) − p ≥  u _( h t ) −  p _( h t ) − ϵΔ > (1 − 2ϵ)Δ >  δ s−t ( u _( h s ) −  p _( h s ) ) , 
where the last inequality is self-evident if  u _( h s ) −  p _( h s ) ≤ 0 and otherwise follows 
from the definition of Δ and the assumption that ϵ < (1 − δ)/2. Because the types 
remaining at history  h s have values v = u + w ≥  u _( h s ), the above inequality yields 
v − p >  δ s−t ( v −  p _( h s ) ) so all these types prefer to buy at time t rather than delay 
until time s, contradicting the assumption that some types delay.
Any price  p ≤  p _( h t ) + ϵ Δ thus leads to an immediate sale. Hence, prices 
p ∈ [  p _( h t ) ,  p _( h t ) + ϵΔ) are not a best response, and  p _( h t ) is not the minimum of the 
support of prices the seller charges at  h t , contradicting the supposition that Δ > 0.
PROPOSITION 1: There is a PBE in which the buyer and seller use monopoly strat-
egies. This PBE is essentially unique.
PROOF:
To check that the monopoly strategies form a PBE is straightforward: if the buyer 
exits or buys in period t = 1, then charging the monopoly price forever is a best 
response; if the seller charges a constant price, then the buyer will exit or buy in 
period t = 1.
To demonstrate the payoff-equivalence of all PBE, we claim that in period 1 the 
buyer either buys or exits, irrespective of the price posted by the seller. Suppose, 
by contradiction, that there is a PBE and a seller’s price  p 1 (either on path or off 
path) such that some positive measure subset of types decide to delay, and let  u _( h 2 ) 
be the minimum of the support of their net values. Exiting in period t ≥ 2 cannot 
be better than exiting at t = 1, so a positive measure of types with u <  u _( h 2 ) + ϵ 
and ϵ ∈  ( 0,  1 − δ _δ   w _) buy in some period t ≥ 2 with positive probability. Lemma 1 
and the consistency of the seller’s beliefs implies that p( h t ) ≥  u _( h t ) ≥  u _( h 2 ), so for 
u <  u _( h 2 ) + ϵ, we have
  δ t−1 (v − p( h t )) ≤  δ t−1 (v −  u _( h 2 )) <  δ t−1 (v − u + ϵ) =  δ t−1 (w + ϵ) ≤ w ,
where the last inequality uses ϵ ≤  1 − δ _δ   w _. Hence, these types prefer to exit at t = 1 
rather than wait, contradicting the assumption that a positive mass delays.
Thus, for any price  p 1 posted by the seller, the buyer either buys or exercises 
his outside option at time 1 in any PBE. Incentive compatibility for the buyer then 
implies that the buyer buys if v −  p 1 > w and exercises his outside option if v − 
p 1 < w. An indifferent buyer, v −  p 1 = w, can do either if there is measure zero of 
661BOARD AND PYCIA: FAILURE OF THE COASE CONJECTUREVOL. 104 NO. 2
such types; if there is a positive mass of indifferent types, incentive compatibility 
for the seller requires that these indifferent types choose to buy with probability 
1. Given the buyer’s behavior, the seller maximizes  p 1 ( 1 − F ( p 1 ) ) , which has a 
unique optimum.
Lemma 1 states that the seller will never give any rents to the type with the lowest 
net valuation  u _. Proposition 1 uses this to show that type  u _ should take the outside 
option rather than delay, causing the set of waiting buyers to unravel from the bot-
tom. Since there is no delay for any initial price  p 1 , the seller’s problem collapses to 
the static problem.
Proposition 1 has interesting implications for the theory of monopoly pricing. 
It suggests that sellers may offer a range of heterogeneous products in order to 
help them commit to high prices. If a monopolist sells a single product, it might be 
tempted to cut its price over time via the Coase conjecture. If it also has a second 
product that appeals to low-value customers, this will provide an outside option, 
clearing out the low end of the market and helping it to commit to the high price. 
In addition, the result shows that the seller makes the same profits as if it commit-
ted to prices at time t = 1. Hence, with outside options, the sequentially optimal 
mechanism can be implemented in prices, as in Skreta (2006), and coincides with 
the optimal commitment mechanism.5
In the model, we suppose there is a single buyer, but one can obtain the same 
result when the seller sells a continuum of goods to a continuum of buyers with dif-
ferent values and outside options. As elucidated by Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson 
(1986), this alternative formulation requires that seller’s and buyers’ actions are the 
same for any two histories that differ only in acceptance/exit choices of a measure-
zero set of buyers. While their model does not allow for an exit option, the analy-
sis of the equivalence of the single-buyer and continuum-of-buyers formulations is 
unchanged.
We now consider two extensions of the basic model.
A. Reversible Exit
In the baseline model we assumed that if a buyer chooses to exercise the outside 
option, the game ends and the buyer never returns. This is the right model if the 
buyer purchases a substitute; however, if the buyer simply abandons negotiations 
then he might return at a later date (e.g., the tourist at the bazaar who wishes to see 
local sights). Assuming that the buyer receives flow payoff of (1 − δ)w when out-
side the market and that the seller can see whether the buyer is present, Proposition 
1 applies, and the seller chooses a single monopoly price. The idea is the same as 
before: the lowest type  u _ expects to receive no surplus, so there is no point ever 
returning to the negotiations. To prove the result formally, one can restrict the claim 
of Lemma 1 to histories at which the buyer is present.
5 The result also suggests that the introduction of outside options has applications outside the simple Coase con-
jecture setting: for example, when selling one good over time to multiple buyers (e.g., McAfee and Vincent 1997), 
the Myerson auction should be the unique sequentially optimal mechanism.
662 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARY 2014
B. Types with No Outside Option
The baseline model also assumed that the buyer’s outside option was bounded 
below by  w _ > 0. To the contrary, if all types’ outside options were equal to zero, 
there is a standard Coasian equilibirum, with prices falling over time. One might 
be concerned that if there were only a few such zero-option types, then it is no lon-
ger sequentially optimal for the seller to charge the monopoly price in all periods 
since we would be in a standard Coasian setting once all the high-option types have 
exited. However, we show below that the seller’s profits change continuously when 
we add zero-option types.
To gain some intuition, consider the special case where the buyer has w = 0 
with probability α and a constant w > 0 with probability 1 − α, and suppose 
v ∈ [  v _,  _ v ] with  v _ > 0, so we can use backward induction to construct a pure strat-
egy PBE.6 For any initial price  p 1 , types with values above some cutoff  x 1 purchase 
immediately, and high-option types with values below some cutoff z exit, leaving 
[z,  x 1 ] high-option types and [  v _,  x 1 ] zero-option types in the market. Given subse-
quent prices {  p 2 ,  p 3 , … } and cutoffs { x 2 ,  x 3 , … }, buyer z is determined so that he 
is indifferent between exiting at time t = 1 and buying at time τ := min{t :  x t ≤ z}, 
i.e., w =  δ τ−1 (z −  p τ ). Since z is indifferent between staying and exiting the market 
at t = 1, types [z,  x 1 ] strictly prefer to buy or remain in the market in later periods in 
any equilibrium, allowing us to ignore the exit constraints in periods t ≥ 2. For any 
given z we can thus characterize prices and cutoffs via backwards induction, as in 
Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986, Theorem 1).
As α → 0, the mass of delaying types converges to zero, and profits converge to 
those in the static problem. To see why, suppose this were not the case and the set 
of delaying high-option types converged to [z,  x 1 ] with  x 1 > z. As α → 0, the seller 
would work through these types increasingly slowly as the incentive to drop the 
price below z and sell to the zero-option types decreases. Specifically, since selling 
to type z would cause a discrete fall in the price, the seller would prefer to subdivide 
any set [z,  x t ] if α is sufficiently small, postponing the price drop and raising rev-
enue from (most of) the remaining high-option types. As a result, τ → ∞ and type 
z would prefer to exit in period t = 1, contradicting the assumption that a positive 
mass of high-option types delays.
We now formally show that the equilibrium payoffs are continuous in the distribu-
tion of types. We derive this continuity result in a discretized version of the model 
in order to avoid measurability issues arising in games with a continuum of types 
and actions.7 As before, the seller chooses prices over time, and the buyer chooses 
whether to buy, wait, or take the outside option. The buyer privately knows his value 
for the good v ∈ V ⊂  [ 0,  _ v ] and the outside option w ∈ W ⊂ [0,  _ w ], where  _ v ,  _ w are 
finite. What changes is that (i) we allow the outside option to take value zero, and 
(ii) we discretize the type and action spaces: we restrict the sets V and W to be finite, 
and assume that there is a lowest monetary unit  p 0 and the seller is restricted to post 
prices p ∈  { k p 0 | k = 0, 1, 2, … } .
6 If  v _ = 0, then there may be non-Markovian equilibria with higher profits, as in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989).
7 We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting the discretized approach to the continuity result.
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Consider a sequence of cdf distributions  G α of  ( v, w ) such that  G α →  G 0 in 
distribution as α → 0. Assume that the limit distribution  G 0 has support contained 
in [0,  _ v ] × [  w _,  _ w ] for some  w _ > 0 and has a unique static monopoly price.8 When 
defining a PBE, we assume that the seller puts positive probability on buyer’s types 
only in the support of  G α ; as a result, the model under  G 0 is a special case of the 
baseline model. Such an equilibrium exists for any α by Fudenberg and Levine 
(1983, Theorem 6.1). In addition, under the limit distribution  G 0 , an analog to 
Proposition 1 holds when the price grid is sufficiently fine, implying that there is an 
essentially unique equilibrium. We then have:
PROPOSITION 2: Assume  p 0 is sufficiently small. As α → 0 the PBE payoffs of the 
buyer and seller converge pointwise to the unique PBE payoff profile at α = 0.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 asserts that the PBE payoffs are upper hemi-continuous as α → 0. 
While true in our model, this is not a general property of PBE; for example, in 
Spence’s signaling model, payoffs are discontinuous in a separating equilibrium as 
the mass of low types shrinks to zero. The general problem is that while the limit of 
equilibrium strategies is optimal given limit beliefs, the PBE beliefs may fail upper 
hemi-continuity. In our setting, this arises because the limit beliefs at some histories 
may put positive probability on w <  w _ as α → 0, which is inconsistent with beliefs 
at α = 0. We thus prove Proposition 2 by showing that Proposition 1, and its dis-
cretized analog, rely only on histories where beliefs are consistent in the limit as 
α → 0. Roughly, we suppose that high-option types delay with positive probability, 
prove the seller’s beliefs are consistent on these histories, and show that the high-
option type with the lowest net value would then prefer to exit.
Proposition 2 considers what happens as α → 0, for a fixed δ. However, the order 
of limits matters. As δ → 1 for fixed α, monopoly pricing remains an equilibrium, 
but there is another equilibrium with Coasian dynamics. To understand why, observe 
that, in a pure strategy equilibrium, buyers either exit in period t = 1 or stay until 
they buy. If any buyers choose to remain, the t ≥ 2 subgame is analogous to a stan-
dard Coase model, and prices will converge to the lowest net value as δ → 1, as in 
Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986, Theorems 3– 4).9
8 In order for there to be a unique PBE under  G 0 , there must be a unique equilibrium to the static game (in 
which a buyer must either buy the good or take the outside option). With a continuous price space we need only 
assume there is a unique monopoly price; if there is an atom of buyer types they must all buy, else the seller will 
lower its price. With discrete prices and types, the same is true if the price grid is sufficiently fine. Let  p ∗ maximize 
p ( 1 −  F  0 ( p ) ) on the grid of prices, where  F  0 ( p) is the measure of net values v − w strictly below p in the limit 
distribution  G 0 . If there were an atom at  p ∗ of size m, and  p 0 ≤ m p ∗ , then there would be at least two monopoly 
prices,  p ∗ and  p ∗ −  p 0 , depending on how we break the tie at the atom. Hence, the assumption of a unique monopoly 
price implies that  p ∗ does not lie on the grid of net values.
9 There is a subtlety here that is not present in the standard Coase model since the period t ≥ 2 distribution is 
endogenous, determined by the buyers who delay in t = 1. In particular, the increase in δ raises buyers’ continu-
ation values in the t ≥ 2 continuation game, and thus more buyers delay for a fixed  p 1 . While this may affect the 
rate prices fall as δ → 1, the Cosian dynamics can be supported in the t ≥ 2 subgame even in the worst-case sce-
nario where all high-value buyers delay, i.e.,  x 1 =  _ v , while the introduction of more low-value buyers speeds up 
convergence.
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II. Search
In Section I we examined a single seller facing a single buyer with outside option 
w. We now endogenize the outside option by considering a model of sequential 
search and show that there is a unique equilibrium where sellers charge the monop-
oly price against their residual demand.
The market consists of mass one of ex ante identical sellers, each with zero mar-
ginal cost, and mass one of buyers. A buyer has private value at seller i, denoted  v i ; 
these values are constant across time and i.i.d. across sellers with continuous density 
f (·) and distribution F (·) on [0,   _ v ].
Each period proceeds as follows:
 (i) A buyer chooses to stay with his current seller or picks a new one at random;
 (ii) If a buyer arrives at a new seller, he observes his value  v i at that seller;
 (iii) The seller quotes a price to the buyer; we can either assume that seller i 
observes the entire history of the market or just the history at seller i. Denote 
the price sequence charged by seller i by {  p 1 i ,  p 2 i , … }.
Since δ < 1, seller j has some market power and can guarantee itself a strictly posi-
tive profit. That is, even if the prices of all sellers (including itself) are zero in future, 
the seller adds value v − δ max{v, w} when v > δw and can thus make positive 
profits, where w <  _ v is the value of moving onto another seller. Since the seller 
earns positive profits and the density of values is continuous, seller j will thus charge 
p 1 j <  _ v in any equilibrium, and the buyer will earn strictly positive utility in expec-
tation. Hence, when facing seller i, the buyer has a strictly positive outside option, 
w > 0, allowing us to apply Proposition 1 and conclude that in any PBE each seller 
i charges a constant price  p i . It is then straightforward to solve for the optimal prices:
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose the hazard rate f (v)/[1 − F(v)] is increasing in v. There 
is an essentially unique equilibrium in which each seller charges a constant price 
p satisfying
(1) p  [  f  ( v ∗ ) _ 1 − F( v ∗ ) ] = 1.
A buyer purchases if v ≥  v ∗ and otherwise moves on to another seller. The cutoff 
 v ∗ satisfies
(2)  v ∗ − p = δ  E v [max {v − p,  v ∗ − p}].
PROOF:
Suppose seller i chooses  p i and other sellers charge some distribution of prices 
inducing continuation value w. We can define a cutoff  v i ∗ where a buyer is indifferent 
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between buying from seller i and continuing his search, i.e.,  v i ∗ −  p i = δw. Seller i’s 
profit per buyer is thus proportional to
 Π =  p i [1 − F( v i ∗ )] =  p i [1 − F(δ w +  p i )].
Profits are weakly negative at the boundaries where  v i ∗ ∈ {0,  _ v }, so the optimal cut-
off  v i ∗ must be interior. Differentiating then yields the necessary first-order condition
  p i f (δ w +  p i ) − (1 − F(δw +  p i )) = 0,
which is sufficient because the objective is log-concave. Since f  (·) has increasing 
hazard, this equation has a unique solution, implying that any equilibrium must be 
symmetric,  p i = p for all i. In such a symmetric equilibrium the f.o.c. yields (1) 
as required. The equilibrium cutoff itself satisfies δw =  v ∗ − p, or (2). The equi-
librium is unique: an increase in p raises the cutoff and, since f  (·) has increasing 
hazard rate, strictly raises the left-hand side of (1). 
With competition via sequential search, the Coase conjecture fails, and sellers set 
a constant price; in equilibrium the sellers all choose the same price. The pricing 
formula (1) says that when seller i lowers its price by ϵ, it loses ϵ on all its current 
customers (measure 1) but gains sales from the marginal customers (measure f ( v ∗ )) 
of all those who visit it  ( measure 1/(1 − F( v ∗ )) ) .
An increase in δ raises the competition between sellers, lowering prices p. 
Observe that equation (2) implies that  v ∗ (p; δ) increases in (p; δ) pointwise. Hence, 
an increase in δ implies that p must fall in order for (1) to be satisfied with equality. 
In the limit, as δ → 1 we obtain perfect competition:  v ∗ (p; δ) →  _ v uniformly across 
p ≥ 0, implying that f ( v ∗ ( p; δ))/ ( 1 − F( v ∗ ( p; δ)) ) → ∞ and the equilibrium price 
converges to 0.10 From a buyer’s perspective, limited competition reduces his util-
ity vis-a-vis no competition since the unwillingness of fellow buyers to wait helps 
sellers commit to high prices; however, buyers still benefit from lots of competition.
One can extend this result to allow for correlation of buyers’ values across sell-
ers. Assume buyers have one of finitely many private types θ ∈ Θ with probability 
mass function g(θ) and values that are conditionally i.i.d.,  v i ∼ f (· | θ) with full sup-
port on [0,  _ v ]. Over time, buyers with higher types tend to leave the market sooner; 
however, if seller i’s prices depend only on the history at seller i (which is analogous 
to the sellers not knowing in which order the buyers visit them), then Proposition 3 
extends, and the unique equilibrium price is given by
 p ∑  
θ∈Θ
 
 [ f ( v ∗ (θ) | θ)  __  1 − F( v ∗ (θ) | θ) ] g(θ) = 1,
where the cutoff for type θ is determined by  v ∗ (θ)  −  p  =  δ  E v|θ [max{v  − 
p,  v ∗ (θ) − p}].
10 The fact that f (v)/[1 − F(v)] → ∞ follows from the assumption that the hazard rate is increasing, so a limit 
exits, and that v has finite support. With infinite support, this condition may not hold (e.g., with an exponential 
distribution, where the hazard rate is constant).
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III. Conclusion
This article considered a classic Coase pricing game, where buyers have an out-
side option that they may exercise each period, either abandoning their search or 
moving on to another seller. The outside option leads low-value buyers to exit the 
market rather than delay consumption, countering the negative selection that drives 
the Coase conjecture. This has a stark effect—there is a unique equilibrium in which 
the seller charges the monopoly price in every period, and buyers either immediately 
purchase or exit. By embedding the single-seller model into a search framework and 
endogenizing the outside option, this result also simplifies pricing in a search model, 
providing a foundation for the traditional price-posting assumption.
The article has  practical  implications when studying durable-goods firms in con-
texts where buyers have outside options. For example, in monopolization cases, 
our model might make one more skeptical of firms using Coasian logic to argue 
that they face competition from their past selves (e.g., United States v. Alcoa, 148 
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). And in merger cases, the result illustrates how a require-
ment that merging firms licence their product to a competitor (e.g., the Borland and 
Ashton-Tate 1991 merger) may affect buyers’ outside options and the merged firm’s 
commitment power.11
There are a number of interesting ways to extend the model. First, outside options 
may arrive as the game proceeds, and this arrival may or may not be observable to 
the seller. For example, Apple first released the iPhone in June 2007 and had an 
effective monopoly on smartphones until the Android launched in October 2008. 
Second, buyers may enter the market over time, mitigating the unravelling force 
analogous to Section IB. Third, in the search model, there might be Diamond-style 
switching costs when moving between sellers, meaning that while some buyers 
switch, others will wait for a price drop.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
A. Preliminaries
Consider a sequence of distributions  G α of  ( v, w ) such that  G α →  G 0 (in distri-
bution) as α → 0. Assume that the limit distribution  G 0 has support contained in 
[0,  _ v ] × [  w _,  _ w ] for some  w _ > 0 and has a unique monopoly price. We then wish to 
show that PBE payoffs under  G α converge to the unique PBE payoffs under  G 0 as 
α → 0.
The proof of Proposition 2 is based on the observation that the set of payoff pro-
files and the set of strategy-belief profiles is compact. The compactness implies that 
it is enough to show that all convergent sequences of strategy-belief profiles have 
the same limit payoffs. If we knew that the limit strategy-belief profile is a PBE, 
we could then invoke a discretized analog of Proposition 1 to show the uniqueness 
of limit payoffs. The problem is that a limit of PBEs may not be a PBE itself: in 
the limit, buyers’ actions are optimal given beliefs, but the limit beliefs may fail to 
11 See Orbach (2004) for discussion of the Alcoa case, and Katz and Shapiro (1999) for Borland and Ashton-Tate.
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 satisfy the PBE consistency condition. That is, at some histories h, the limit belief 
may put positive probability on buyer types outside the support of  G 0 (i.e., with 
w <  w _). We overcome this problem by showing that an analog of Proposition 1 
obtains when the limit beliefs are consistent on a large set of histories we call H, and 
then proving that the beliefs are indeed consistent on H.
Let us first introduce some notation and define the set H. At public history h, 
denote by  σ s ( h ) the strategy of the seller, by  σ v, w ( h ) the strategy of the buyer of 
type  ( v, w ) , and by λ ( h ) the belief of the seller over buyer types. In particular, 
 σ v, w ( h )  ( a ) is the probability that buyer of type  ( v, w ) takes action a at history h, and λ ( h )  ( v, w ) is the probability buyer has type  ( v, w ) at history h. We denote the pro-
file of buyers’ strategies by σ =  ( σ s ,  ( σ v, w )  ( v, w ) ∈V×W ) . For any profile of strategies σ and beliefs λ, we define H = H ( σ, λ ) recursively as the smallest set of histories 
such that:
 (i) The empty history ⊘ belongs to H.
 (ii) If h ∈ H and a is the seller’s action at h, then  ( h, a ) ∈ H.
 (iii) If h ∈ H and a is the buyer’s action at h, then  ( h, a ) ∈ H if and only if the 
belief λ ( h ) puts strictly positive probability on buyer types  ( v, w ) that take 
action a with positive probability according to the strategy  σ v, w , that is
  ∑  
 ( v, w ) ∈V×W
 
 
 λ ( h )  ( v, w ) ·  σ v, w ( h )  ( a ) > 0.
Intuitively, set H allows for deviations by the seller but does not allow buyers to take 
actions outside the support of  σ v, w .
We then say that a profile of strategies σ and beliefs λ is a quasi-PBE if (i) the 
buyers’ strategies are optimal given beliefs at any history, and (ii) the seller updates 
her beliefs according to the Bayes’ rule at histories from set H. Importantly, at his-
tories outside H the quasi-PBE allows the seller to put positive probability on any 
type in V × W, including types not in the support of λ ( ⊘ ) . Of course, any PBE is a 
quasi-PBE, but a quasi-PBE does not insist on applying Bayes’ rule after the buyer 
has taken a zero-probability action. In a one-period game, the two concepts coincide.
Next we formulate and prove the analog of Proposition 1 for quasi-PBE in the 
discretized model.
LEMMA 1*: Suppose  p 0 is sufficiently small. In any quasi-PBE, if the seller believes 
that the buyer’s net value is above  u _ at some history from H, then she charges prices 
above  u _ −  p 0 at that history.
The proof of Lemma 1* is similar to the proof of Lemma 1, except we wish to 
show that  p _(h) ≥  u _(h) −  p 0 for all h ∈ H, rather than  p _(h) ≥  u _(h) for all h, defining Δ = su p h∈H   ( u _  ( h ) −  p _( h ) −  p 0 ) accordingly. To do this we suppose, by contradic-
tion, that Δ > 0. For any  h t where Δ is nearly attained, we claim that any price 
p ≤  p _( h t ) +  p 0 +ϵΔ leads the buyer to purchase at time t, which guarantees that 
there exists a price on the grid to which the seller can defect. To prove the buyer 
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prefers to buy at time t rather than time s > t, we suppose, by contradiction, that 
some mass of buyers does delay after the deviation. Since the seller deviates, while 
buyers are playing equilibrium strategies, the history  h s is contained in H, allowing 
us to use Bayes’ rule. The algebra is then similar to Lemma 1, with the additional 
assumption that  p 0 ≤  1 − δ _δ   w _.
PROPOSITION 1*: Consider distribution  G 0 and suppose  p 0 is sufficiently small. 
There is a quasi-PBE (and PBE) in which the buyer and seller use monopoly strate-
gies. This quasi-PBE (and PBE) is essentially unique.
The essential uniqueness of quasi-PBE is a stronger property than the essential 
uniqueness of PBE. For instance, if the probability of the low type is zero in the 
Spence signaling model, then there is a unique PBE but multiple quasi-PBEs. For 
this reason, the PBE payoffs in Spence’s model are not upper hemi-continuous even 
though the quasi-PBEs payoffs are upper hemi-continuous. Indeed, our proof below 
applies to a broad class of games and may have other applications beyond the cur-
rent model.
The proof of Proposition 1* is largely the same as Proposition 1. For any initial 
price  p 1 , if a positive mass of types delay then the resulting history  h 2 ∈ H leads to 
a lowest type  u _( h 2 ) that delays. Furthermore, by Bayes’ rule  u _( h 2 ) is a lower bound 
on net values at all continuations of history  h 2 that belong to H, and the buyers put 
probability 1 on continuation histories from H. Thus Lemma 1* implies that type 
 u _( h 2 ) expects to obtain at most δ(v −  u _( h 2 ) +  p 0 ) and, if  p 0 <  1 − δ _δ   w _ , strictly 
prefers to exit and obtain  w _ instead. Intuitively, if the lowest net value buyer delays 
he obtains rents at most δ p 0 , but he gives up the rental value of the outside option (1 − δ)w. Hence, all buyers purchase immediately or exit for any initial  p 1 in any 
quasi-PBE. Since we assumed that there is a unique monopoly price and the price 
grid is sufficiently fine, there is an essentially unique static PBE (see footnote 8), 
and an essentially unique quasi-PBE to the entire game.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We endow the set of profiles of strategies and beliefs  ( σ, λ ) with the standard 
product topology. Since all buyer types’ net values are bounded above by  
_ v we can 
restrict attention to strategies in which all prices come from the compact subgrid 
Γ =  { k p 0 | k = 0, 1, 2, … ⌊   _ v  _  p 0  ⌋ + 1 } , where  ⌊ x ⌋ denotes the largest inte-
ger such that  ⌊ x ⌋ ≤ x. For each history h, the seller’s action  σ s ( h ) takes 
value in the compact set of lotteries Δ ( Γ ) ⊂  [ 0, 1 ] Γ ; any of the finite num-
ber of types  ( v, w ) ∈ V × W takes actions  σ v, w ( h ) from the compact set of lot-
teries Δ ( { exit,buy,wait } ) ⊂  [ 0, 1 ]  { exit,buy,wait }  ; and the seller’s belief lies in 
Δ ( V × W ) ⊂  [ 0, 1 ] V×W . Thus, for a fixed history h the set of strategy-belief profiles 
is compact in the standard topology on  [ 0, 1 ] Γ ×  [ 0, 1 ]  { exit,buy,wait } ×V×W ×  [ 0, 1 ] V×W . 
By Tychonoff’s Theorem, the set of strategy-belief profiles is compact in the prod-
uct topology over histories h.
Given a strategy-belief profile  ( σ, λ ) , let Π =  ( Π s ,  ( Π v, w )  ( v, w ) ∈V×W ) be the profile 
of expected payoffs at the null history ⊘. Observe that payoffs Π are  continuous in 
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( σ, λ ) . This follows because discounting and the boundedness of per-period payoffs 
imply that periods in the far future have a negligible impact on initial payoffs. Thus 
product-topology convergence of strategy-belief profiles on any finitely long set of 
histories implies the convergence of payoffs obtained at these histories.
Let  Π ∗ ∈ ℝ ×  ℝ V×W be the unique profile of expected payoffs that, by 
Proposition 1*, obtains in all quasi-PBE under  G  0 . We wish to show that any 
sequence of strategy-belief profiles  ( σ  α ,  λ α ) that form a PBE for initial belief 
 G  α induces payoffs  Π α that converge to  Π ∗ in the standard topology on ℝ ×  ℝ V×W 
as α → 0. Let us initially consider the case when the sequence of strategy-belief 
profiles is convergent.
Claim: If the sequence of strategy-belief profiles  ( σ α ,  λ α ) converges as α → 0, 
then the sequence of payoff profiles  Π α converges to  Π ∗ in the standard topology on 
ℝ ×  ℝ V×W .
To prove the claim denote by  ( σ 0 ,   λ 0 ) the limit of  ( σ  α ,  λ α ) as α → 0. Let 
us show that  ( σ  0 ,  λ 0 ) is a quasi-PBE. First, as the payoffs are continuous in the 
strategy-belief profile, the Maximum Theorem implies that the best responses 
are upper hemi-continuous, i.e., if seller’s strategy  σ s α is a best response to 
 ( ( σ v, w α )  ( v, w ) ∈V×W ,  λ α ) for all α, then  σ s 0 is a best-response to  ( ( σ v, w 0 )  ( v, w ) ∈V×W ,  λ 0 ) , 
and similarly for buyer’s strategies. Hence, given  λ 0 , the strategies  σ  0 are mutual 
best responses. Second, to show that the limit profile satisfies the consistency condi-
tions of a quasi-PBE, we need to check the seller updates his beliefs according to 
Bayes’ rule at histories from the set H = H ( σ  0 ,  λ 0 ) :
 (i) At the empty history the seller’s belief is  λ 0 (⊘) = li m α→0  λ α (⊘) = li m α→0  G α =  G 0 and, hence, agrees with the distribution of buyer types  G  0 .
 (ii) If h ∈ H and a is the seller’s action at h, then beliefs  λ α are unaffected by the 
choice of a, and so  λ 0 = li m α→0    λ α are also unaffected.
 (iii) If h ∈ H and a is the buyer’s action at h such that
  ∑  
 ( v, w ) ∈V×W
 
 
  λ 0 ( h )  ( v, w ) ·  σ v, w 0 ( h )  ( a ) > 0,
  then  ∑  ( v, w ) ∈V×W    λ α ( h )  ( v, w )   σ v, w α ( h )  ( a ) > 0 for α close to 0. Since the 
denominator is strictly positive, the continuity of Bayes’ rule implies
       λ 0 ( {h, a} ) (v, w) =  lim 
α→0
 
 
  λ α ( {h, a} ) (v, w) 
 =  lim 
α→0
 
 
    λ 
α ( h )  ( v, w ) ·  σ v, w α ( h )  ( a ) 
   ___  ∑ 
v, w
 
  λ α ( h )  ( v, w ) ·  σ v, w α ( h )  ( a ) 
 
 =   λ 
0 ( h )  ( v, w ) ·  σ v, w 0 ( h )  ( a ) 
   ___  ∑ 
v, w
 
  λ 0 ( h )  ( v, w ) ·  σ v, w 0 ( h )  ( a )  .
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The limit beliefs  λ 0 are thus consistent with the limit strategies  σ  0 , and the 
limit strategy-belief profile  ( σ  0 ,  λ 0 ) is a quasi-PBE. By Proposition 1*, the limit 
 strategy-belief profile induces payoffs  Π  ∗ . As the payoffs are continuous in 
the strategy-belief profile, so the sequence of payoffs  Π  α converges to  Π  ∗ . This 
proves the claim.
Now, consider the general case when the sequence of strategy-belief profiles 
 ( σ  α ,  λ α ) need not be convergent. By way of contradiction, assume that  Π  α does 
not converge to  Π  ∗ . Then there is an open neighborhood U ⊆ ℝ ×  ℝ V×W of  Π  ∗ 
and a subsequence of  ( σ  α ,  λ α ) such that the payoff profiles along the subsequence 
never belong to U. Since the space of strategy-belief profiles is compact, this last 
 subsequence has a convergent subsubsequence  ( σ  α n  ,  λ  α n  ) . Yet the above claim 
implies that since  ( σ  α n  ,  λ  α n  ) converges, so the corresponding payoffs  Π  α n  converge 
to  Π  ∗ , yielding a contradiction. Hence, the payoffs of any sequence of PBEs con-
verge to the unique quasi-PBE payoffs  Π  ∗ , which is also the unique PBE payoff.
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